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ABSTRACT 
 
Social power, or potential for social influence, has traditionally been 
conceptualized according to French and Raven’s (1959) power typology. The 
purpose of this analysis was to examine the relationship between a commonly used 
scale measuring the original 5-factor model and a more recently developed scale 
measuring the revised 11-factor model, and evaluate the predictive utility of each. 
Correlations between corresponding bases on the two scales were weak, suggesting 
a lack of convergent validity. In addition, the 5-factor scale accounted for a 
substantially greater proportion of variance than did the 11-factor scale when 
predicting global power.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past several decades, the processes of social power and influence have 
held a prominent place in psychological theories, particularly in the areas of social 
and industrial/organizational psychology (Podsakoff and Schriesheim 1985).  
Social power refers to the latent potential of a person or group (the agent) to 
influence the beliefs, attitudes, or behaviour of another person or group (the target; 
Raven 1965).  Power is unobservable and can only be measured in an abstract 
sense; nevertheless, its acquisition and maintenance is considered a crucial process 
in organizations (Hinkin and Schriesheim 1994), since it appears to be closely 
related to variables such as job satisfaction, role performance, and conflict (Drea, 
Bruner, and Hensel 1993).   
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Although many models of social power have been proposed, French and Raven’s 
(1959) typology has been among the most influential and widely used (Podsakoff  
and Schrieshiem 1985).  French and Raven’s (1959) typology originally consisted 
of five bases of power: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, expert 
power, and referent power.  Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989:562) define reward 
power as “the ability to administer to another things he or she desires or to remove 
or decrease things he or she does not desire”; coercive power as “the ability to 
administer to another things he or she does not desire or to remove or decrease 
things he or she does desire”; legitimate power as “the ability to administer to 
another feelings of obligation or responsibility”; and expert power as “the ability to 
administer to another information, knowledge, or expertise”.  Finally, referent 
power can be defined as the ability to make the target feel attraction to or 
identification with the agent (Carson, Carson, and Roe 1993). In 1965, Raven 
differentiated informational power, which had previously been included with 
expert power.  Informational power can be defined as the ability to persuade 
another through information or logical argument (Raven 2001). 
 
French and Raven were certainly not the only theorists to explore the 
conceptualization of power and its potential to explain and predict social influence.  
For example, Emerson (1962, 1964) introduced an influential theory of power-
dependence relationships, positing that power differentials result from the 
dependencies of individuals on each other for valuable resources.  For example, 
person A is dependent on person B to the extent that A values the resources that are 
available through B and that those resources are not available through other means.  
He later expanded the scale of this idea by applying it to larger exchange networks 
(i.e., a set of individuals that are directly or indirectly linked together in a network 
of dependencies; Emerson 1972, 1976).  At first glance it might appear that 
Emerson’s conceptualization of power most closely matches a relatively small 
subset of French and Raven’s (1959) power bases (most notably reward power); 
however, Emerson (1962:33) himself notes that “careful attention to our highly 
generalized conception of dependence will show that it covers most if not all of the 
forms of power listed in [French and Raven’s] study”.  Moreover, Willer, Lovaglia, 
and Markovsky (1997) subtly differentiate between power and influence.  Whereas 
French and Raven view the two as essentially the same construct (i.e., power as 
latent influence), Willer et al. treat them as separate but frequently co-occurring 
phenomena.  According to Willer et al. (1997:73), power is “the structurally 
determined potential for obtaining favored payoffs in relations where interests are 
opposed,” whereas influence is “the socially induced modification of a belief, 
attitude, or expectation effected without recourse to sanctions”.  Thus, one can 
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have an exertion of power without influence and vice versa; nevertheless, power 
often produces influence and influence often produces power.   
 
Emerson’s theory, as well as subsequent extensions (e.g., Cook et al. 1983; 
Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988) can be viewed as using a global concept of 
social power to explain and predict influence between individuals and among 
networks of individuals.  French and Raven, on the other hand, attempt to more 
precisely delineate types of power, with the assumption that different types lead to 
different influence outcomes.  Willer et al.’s (1997) distinction between power and 
influence can be (perhaps roughly) likened to a contrast between reward and 
coercive power on the one hand, and legitimate, referent, and expert power on the 
other hand.  It is yet to be determined whether such combining of power types (as 
per Emerson, Willer, and others) is warranted or whether more finely grained 
differentiation among power types (as per French and Raven’s taxonomy) has 
greater utility.  However, in order to empirically evaluate whether different power 
bases lead to different outcomes, one must begin with reliable and valid measures 
of those bases.   
 
Raven (1992) eventually created additional subdivisions within the original, five-
factor power typology.  First, he divided the reward and coercion bases into 
impersonal (referring to real, tangible rewards and punishments) and personal 
(referring to personal approval or the threat of rejection) forms. Second, Raven 
divided legitimate power into four separate bases.  Legitimate power of position, 
also known as formal legitimacy (Raven 2001), is much the same as the original 
conceptualization of legitimate power.  This is power that the agent holds solely on 
the basis of his or her position or status.  Legitimate power of reciprocity, as the 
name suggests, is based on a reciprocity norm that suggests we should feel an 
obligation to do something positive for someone who has done something positive 
for us (Raven 2001; Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998).  Legitimate 
power of equity, drawn from the equity norm, suggests that we should compensate 
someone whom we have harmed or who has in some way suffered (Raven 2001; 
Raven et al. 1998).  Finally, legitimate power of dependence or responsibility, 
sometimes referred to as the “power of the powerless,” suggests that we are 
obligated to assist those who are dependent on us (Raven 2001; Raven et al. 1998).   
 
Although these revisions have addressed many criticisms in of the French and 
Raven (1959) model (see Raven 2001) in terms of definitional and theoretical 
vagueness, most empirical work continues to focus on the original, five-base model 
(Shaffer, Percy, and Tepper 1997).  Thus, it remains to be seen whether Raven’s 
(1992) reconceptualization provides an empirical improvement in the measurement 
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of social power, and indeed whether it is substantively related to French and 
Raven’s original conceptualization of the construct.  The purpose of the present 
research is to examine the relationship between the original and the revised 
inventories of social power, as well as their respective utility in predicting overall 
perceptions of social power.  Such an examination is important for future 
researchers intending to use French and Raven’s original (1959) or Raven’s revised 
(1992) typology to evaluate social power in applied contexts, as accurate 
evaluation depends crucially on valid measures.  
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
The sample consisted of 144 undergraduate students (106 females, 38 males) 
recruited from the Psychology Department participant pool at a Canadian 
University, receiving course credit in exchange for participation.  The mean age of 
the participants was 21.4 years.   
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
Participants were seated in university classrooms in groups of 15-20, and each was 
given a questionnaire booklet containing the following power scales and 
demographic questions.  The Five-Factor Power Scale (5PS; Hinkin and 
Schriesheim 1989) is designed to measure French and Raven’s (1959) original 
five-factor social power typology.  The scale consists of 20 items (four for each 
power base) describing various power resources that a participant’s work 
supervisor (or most recent work supervisor, if they are not currently employed; all 
participants indicated that they had employment experience) might possess.  For 
example, one item states, “My supervisor can increase my pay level,” to which the 
participant indicates her or his agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  Scores on the items for each subscale are summed, 
resulting in measures of targets’ perceptions of their work supervisor’s reward, 
coercive, legitimate, expert, and referent power bases, with higher scores indicating 
perceptions of greater power (possible range = 4 – 20).   
 
The Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI; Raven et al. 1998) is designed to reflect 
Raven’s (1992) reconceptualization of the original power model.  The reward and 
coercive power bases were subdivided into personal and impersonal factors, the 
expert base into expert and informational factors, and the legitimate base into 
factors based on position, equity, reciprocity, and dependence.  The scale asks the 
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participant to vividly imagine a situation in which they complied with their work 
supervisor’s request, and lists 33 possible reasons for complying (3 per power 
base; for example, “My supervisor probably knew more about the job than I did”).  
The participant rates each statement on a 7-point scale ranging from definitely not 
a reason for complying to definitely a reason for complying.  The items for each 
subscale are summed to yield 11 scores corresponding to the 11 revised power 
bases, with higher scores indicating higher perceptions of power (possible range = 
3 – 21).  
 
In addition to the two measures of social power bases, a 4-item measure of global 
(i.e., overall) social power (Nesler et al. 1999) was administered.  The items on this 
measure were similar to those on the 5PS, and were scored in the same way.  
Means and standard deviations for all scales are presented in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficients for the 5PS 
Subscales, IPI Subscales, and Global Power Scale 
 
Scale  M SD α 
5PS    
   Reward 13.74 3.88 .80 
   Coercive 14.31 3.52 .81 
   Legitimate 15.96 2.12 .74 
   Expert 15.78 3.08 .84 
   Referent 16.41 2.43 .76 
    
IPI    
   Personal Reward 13.51 3.58 .70 
   Impersonal Reward 14.08 4.63 .83 
   Personal Coercive 12.12 4.11 .72 
   Impersonal Coercive 12.25 4.57 .76 
   Legitimate Position 15.42 2.95 .60 
   Legitimate Equity 11.67 4.52 .84 
   Legitimate Reciprocity 12.92 3.55 .55 
   Legitimate Dependence 15.30 3.05 .56 
   Expert 15.04 3.29 .77 
   Informational 16.63 3.19 .81 
   Referent 13.16 3.83 .70 
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 Global Power Scale 14.26 2.52 .50 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Coefficient alpha reliabilities for the 5PS and IPI indicated for the most part 
adequate internal consistency reliability (see Table 1).  Coefficient alpha reliability 
for the global power measure was .50, likely due to the limited number of scale 
items.  
 
Intercorrelations among the IPI and 5PS scales are displayed in Table 2.  Although 
many of the correlations between corresponding subscales of the two scales were 
significant, all were low to moderate, ranging from r = .06 to r = .43.  Because 
subscales within each of the IPI and 5PS correlate significantly among themselves, 
a canonical correlation analysis was undertaken in order to create independent 
linear correlations of the two scales.  Two of the five canonical correlations were 
significant, and are displayed in Table 3 with their corresponding unstandardized 
canonical loadings.[1]  The first canonical correlation (Rc = .64) related a 5PS 
variate, contrasting the reward and coercive bases with the remaining three, to an 
IPI variate that contrasted the impersonal reward, personal and impersonal 
coercive, legitimate equity, and legitimate reciprocity bases with the remaining 
bases.  The second canonical correlation (Rc = .51) represented general power 
variates, comprising a combination of all 5PS and all IPI subscales.  Thus, the 
predicted mapping of 5PS power bases onto their IPI counterparts was not 
supported by this analysis.  
 
TABLE 2 
 
Correlations Between the 5PS Subscales and the IPI Subscales 
 
  5PS Subscales  
IPI Subscales Reward Coercive Legitimat
e 
Referent Expert 
Personal Reward .14 -.07 .20* .19* .27** 
Impersonal Reward .43** .16 .07 .00 .07 
Personal Coercive .23** .07 .20* .08 .14 
Impersonal 
Coercive 
.41** .35** .03 -.15 -.08 
Legitimate Position .00 .02 .21* .09 .16 
Legitimate Equity .15 .11 .12 .04 .12 
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Legitimate 
Reciprocity 
.09 .09 .09 .02 .00 
Legitimate 
Dependence 
.13 -.01 .15 .16 .18* 
Referent .09 -.18* .27** .38** .41** 
Expert .00 -.23** .29* .28** .44** 
Informational -.04 -.12 .18* .15 .27** 
* p < .05.  * p < .01.  
 
TABLE 3 
 
Canonical Correlations and Unrotated Canonical Loadings for the Significant 
Variates Relating the 5PS and IPI Subscales 
 
 Variate 1 Variate 2 
Unrotated Canonical Loadings   
     5PS Subscales   
          Reward .43 -.88 
          Coercive .64 -.02 
          Legitimate -.29 -.42 
          Referent -.55 -.39 
          Expert -.62 -.61 
     IPI Subscales   
          Personal Reward -.25 -.48 
          Impersonal Reward .37 -.71 
          Personal Coercive .09 -.49 
          Impersonal Coercive .71 -.51 
          Legitimate Position -.15 -.14 
          Legitimate Equity .08 -.32 
          Legitimate Reciprocity .15 -.13 
          Legitimate Dependence -.12 -.37 
          Referent -.57 -.56 
          Expert -.65 -.43 
          Informational -.41 -.19 
Rc .64 .51 
Wilk’s lambda .38 .64 
df 55 40 
p < .001 .025 
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To evaluate the utility of each of the scales in predicting global power, multiple 
regression analyses were conducted using the Nesler et al. (1999) global power 
measure as the criterion variable.  Overall, the 5PS model predicted a significant 
proportion of variance in global power (R2 = .53, F(5, 138) = 31.32, p < .001), 
whereas the IPI model did not (R2 = .12, F(11, 132), = 1.72, p = .07).  Moreover, 
each of the five subscales of the 5PS model significantly and independently 
predicted global power, whereas the vast majority of the IPI subscales did not (with 
the exception of referent power; see Table 4).  
 
TABLE 4 
 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for the 5PS and IPI Subscales Predicting 
Global Power 
 
Scale  b SE t p 
5PS     
   Reward 0.08 0.04 2.07 .04 
   Coercive 0.17 0.04 3.84 < .001 
   Legitimate 0.34 0.09 3.94 < .001 
   Expert 0.18 0.06 2.99 < .01 
   Referent 0.33 0.08 4.40 < .001 
     
IPI     
   Personal Reward -0.03 0.10 0.32 .75 
   Impersonal Reward 0.09 0.07 1.44 .15 
   Personal Coercive -0.02 0.07 0.23 .82 
   Impersonal Coercive 0.04 0.07 0.56 .58 
   Legitimate Position 0.10 0.09 1.11 .27 
   Legitimate Equity -0.02 0.07 0.31 .76 
   Legitimate 
Reciprocity 
-0.10 0.08 1.29 .20 
   Legitimate 
Dependence 
0.01 0.09 0.03 .98 
   Expert 0.06 0.09 0.67 .50 
   Informational -0.03 0.08 0.39 .70 
   Referent 0.18 0.09 2.12 .04 
 
Finally, tests of increment in R2 were conducted to examine whether subdividing 
the original five social bases into 11 bases in the IPI improved utility in predicting 
global power.   Augmented models of the reward, coercive, legitimate, and expert 
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subdivisions were compared with compact models that collapsed the subdivisions 
into their respective bases.  In none of the analyses did the augmented (i.e., 
subdivided) model provide significantly greater predictive utility than the compact 
model (reward, F (1,141) = 0.143, ns; coercive, F (1,143) < 0.001, ns; legitimate, F 
(3, 139) = 1.143, ns; expert, F (1,141) = 1.430, ns).   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the analyses suggest that the original, five-factor typology and the 
revised, 11-factor model differ considerably in both construct and criterion 
validity.  Correlations among corresponding subscales on the two measures tended 
to be quite low, and a number of significant relationships were revealed between 
non-corresponding power bases.  In addition, the five-factor model significantly 
and substantially predicted scores on a measure of global power (with each of the 
five power bases making independent contributions) whereas the 11-factor model 
did not.  If the IPI and 5PS were indeed measuring the same constructs, we would 
not expect such low correlations among their components and such a drastic 
difference in predictive power.  The analyses suggest that Raven’s (1992) 
subdivision of the original model into 11 distinct bases (while conceptually 
appealing) may have been misguided, and that researchers may be better off 
continuing to use the historically more popular five-factor model.   
 
Nevertheless, the results of both the canonical correlation and the regression 
models suggest that neither the five-factor model nor the 11-factor model fully 
capture the dimensions underlying perceptions of social power.  Indeed, although 
the five-factor model was a much better predictor of global power, it still only 
accounted for 53% of the variability.  Thus, it would appear that there is still a 
large aspect of global power that is not being captured in French and Raven’s five 
factors, and that merely subdividing the existing power bases into more specific 
constructs may not be the most fruitful approach.  Novel bases need to be 
proposed, tested, and integrated into the model.  
 
Although the results provide a useful starting point for clarifying some of the 
issues surrounding the measurement of social power, this study has several 
limitations that should be addressed by future research.  One issue is the possibility 
that the relationships between measures used in the study were affected by 
common method variance (e.g., see Brannick et al. 2010).  All responses were 
made on self-report, Likert-type rating scales, and moreover, the format for the 
5PS and global power measures were similar.  Given that common method 
variance would tend to amplify relationships among similarly measured variables, 
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this issue only serves to damage the case for the IPI even further (i.e., the 
predictive utility of the IPI may be even lower than was demonstrated in this 
study); however, it may have artificially helped the 5PS.  Although it seems 
unrealistic that the substantial amount of variance in global power accounted for by 
the five-factor model was entirely due to common measurement, this remains a 
matter to be resolved.   
 
A second, related issue is the fact that all measures were self-reported percepts.  
This study explicitly dealt with subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisors’ 
power; nevertheless, it would be helpful to obtain behavioral indicators of both 
supervisors’ influence and subordinates’ compliance as well.  Assessing the 
behavioral consequences of power and demonstrating differing effects of the two 
scales (as well as their subscales) would more strongly support the conclusions 
drawn from this research.  It would also be desirable to obtain measures from both 
sides of the power relationship in order to assess convergent validity.  For example, 
data from the actual power holder (both in terms of the actual position and their 
perceptions), and more objective measures such as the number of subordinates 
would help to clarify the utility of these power scales.  As well, contrasting the IPI 
and 5PS with measures less related to power (e.g., status) would add discriminant 
validity.   
 
A third matter that should be addressed in future studies is analytical in nature.  
The statistical tests that were used were chosen based on their ability to address the 
research question, but also partly out of necessity.  One analysis that would be 
enormously helpful, but for which an adequate sample size is lacking, is 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  CFA allows for the verification that the 
relationship between a theoretical, underlying factor structure and a set of observed 
variables exists, but requires a much larger sample size than was available in this 
study (between 5 and 20 observations per item or parameter estimate).  With a 
larger sample, future researchers could obtain a much clearer picture of the 
underlying structure of these power scales.  
 
To conclude, it appears that the original, five-factor model of social power 
proposed by French and Raven has maintained its edge over the latter author’s 
revised model.  Nevertheless, the data presented in this study suggest that the five 
factors do not tell the whole story, and that there is still a great deal of empirical 
and conceptual work that needs to be done before we can have confidence in the 
model.  Future researchers should focus on further empirical exploration of the 
dimensions and the development of new theoretical additions to the current model.  
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Further research is also needed to evaluate these measures in terms of relevant 
behavioral outcomes, such as supervisor efficiency and job satisfaction.   
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. Although it is possible to rotate canonical loadings (e.g., to a Varimax criterion) 
to improve interpretability, rotation is discouraged for canonical correlation due to 
the potential reduction in the optimality of the correlations and introduction of 
interrelationships among pairs of canonical variates (Rencher 2002). 
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